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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 19761
("RCRA") and 1980s Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act2 ("CERCLA"), environmental concerns have become a focus
of attention for businesses and industries. RCRA established a national policy
to reduce the generation of hazardous waste.3 CERCLA established the
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund or "Superfund" to initially pay for
the cleanup of properties contaminated by hazardous substances. 4 CERCLA
directs the United States Environmental Protection Agency to identify sites at
which hazardous substances have been released, identify the parties potentially
responsible for the site or the releases, and ensure that these "potentially
responsible parties"pay for the cleanup of the sites, including reimbursement of
cleanup costs paid by the federal government or by a state.5
The breadth of CERCLA and RCRA and the proliferation of
environmental statutes and regulations at the federal, state, county, and local
level present a significant financial challenge to many corporations and
individuals. Many businesses face demands and lawsuits by government
agencies to clean up or pay for the cleanup of pollution. 6 Furthermore, many
businesses also face private party lawsuits in which plaintiffs seek recovery on
many theories, including negligence, strict liability, trespass, and nuisance.
In the face of these demands and lawsuits, many businesses have turned to
their comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policies for financial
protection. Most insurance carriers, however, deny that they have any duty to
* Kirk A. Pasich is a litigation partner in the Los Angeles firm of Hill Wynne Troop
& Meisinger. He specializes in representing insureds in complex insurance coverage
matters and was one of the counsel for the insured, FMC Corporation, in AU Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court, and for one of the insureds, GAF Corporation, in In re Asbestos
Insurance Coverage Cases. He is also the author of Casualty and Liability Insurance
(Matthew Bender 1991). Mr. Pasich would like to thank Erin M. Walsh for her assistance
in locating and verifying authorities quoted and cited in this Article.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
2 Id. §§ 9601-9657.
3 Id. § 6902(b).
4 Id. § 9631.
5 See, e.g., id. § 9605.
6 Id. § 9607.
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pay the costs of cleaning up the environment or to pay damage claims against
their insureds. Thus, insureds and insurance carriers are now litigating over
myriad issues with respect to insurance carriers' obligations to defend and
indemnify their insureds against claims relating to environmental
contamination. The insurance carriers assert broad-based defenses to coverage.
When these defenses fail, the insurance carriers turn to fact-based defenses that
require months, or years, of discovery, to be followed by months of trial.
Additionally, the parties litigate over which portions of the insurance policies
provide coverage and how those portions of the insurance policies are to be
interpreted.
This Article focuses on the key issues that have been, and will continue to
be, the subject of insurance coverage litigation for environmental claims. The
discussion commences with an overview of CGL insurance coverage. Then the
discussion focuses on interpretation of the language in insurance contracts. This
is followed by discussions of four substantive issues-whether the costs of
environmental cleanup constitute "damages" insured by CGL insurance
policies, the "expected or intended" exclusion, the pollution exclusion, and a
relatively unexplored area of insurance coverage for environmental claims, the
"personal injury" provisions. This article demonstrates that the insurance
industry has, for decades, expected its broad CGL policies to cover pollution-
related claims. That expectation has been honored by most courts, which have
rejected the insurance carriers' arguments that environmental cleanup costs are
not damages, that the expected or intended exclusion eliminates coverage, and
that the pollution exclusion eliminates coverage. The same historical
perspective and the language of the relevant provisions also demonstrate that,
contrary to arguments advanced today, insurance carriers long have expected
the personal injury provisions of CGL policies to provide coverage for
environmental cleanup. In short, while litigation may rage on for years over
insurance coverage for environmental claims, insureds should be expected to
prevail in most cases.
H. THE CGL INSURANCE POLICY
Until the 1940s, the insurance industry sold policies that provided coverage
only for specific risks. In the late 1940s, this gave way to the "comprehensive"
general liability policy, which was intended to insure all risks not specifically
excluded. 7
7 See J.M. Campbell, Specific Policies on the Way Out-Comprelensive Takes
Over, The Local Agent 16 (Mar. 1949) ("Today we have come to the point when separate
coverages must give way to a [sic] comprehensive policies for all industrial and mercantile
risks.") The Kentucky Supreme Court has explained the breadth of CGL insurance policies
as follows:
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A. The Relevant Insurance Policy Language
The insuring agreement of a CGL policy typically provides that the
insurance carrier will:
Pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of
[Coverage] A. bodily injury or
[Coverage] B. property damage
to which this [insurance] applies, caused by an occurence .... 8
"Bodily injury" is typically defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death
at any time resulting therefrom." 9
"Property damage"often is defined as:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting
therefrom, or
(2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured
or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the
policy period. 10
CGL insurance policies also typically impose on the insurance carrier the
separate obligation to defend and/or pay the expenses of defending suits against
the insured.II The defense provision of the standard form CGL policy typically
states that the insurance carrier "shall have the right and duty to defend any suit
The primary purpose of a comprehensive general liability policy is to provide broad
comprehensive insurance. Obviously the very name of the policy suggests the
expectation of maximum coverage. Consequently the comprehensive policy has been
one of the most preferred by businesses and governmental entities over the years
because that policy has provided the broadest coverage available. All risks not
expressly excluded are covered, including those not contemplated by either party.
James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d
273, 278 (Ky. 1991), as modified (Sept. 26, 1991).
8 3 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC'ICE App. A (1991).
9 Id. § 49.05.
10 Id. § 49.0611].
11 See American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1951) ("The
obligation to defend suits is entirely independent of the obligation to pay for bodily injuries
and property damage. The two obligations are assumed in different paragraphs of the
contract and under distinctive sub-heads.")
1991] 1133
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
against the insured seeking damages on account of... bodily injury or
property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent ... .-"12 The standard CGL policy also states that the insurance
carrier will pay any expenses incurred by the insured and all costs taxed against
the insured in any such suit.1 3
While indemnity payments typically reduce or impair the policy's
aggregate limit, defense payments generally do not do so. The "Supplementary
Payments" section of the 1973 CGL form provides that the expenses incurred
by, and costs taxed against, the insured in defending a lawsuit are in addition to
the limits of coverage provided. 14
B. Insurance Policy Interpretation
In most states, disputes concerning the meaning of language in insurance
policies are resolved by application of long-established contract interpretation
principles. These principles may be summarized as follows:
1. The language in insurance policies will be given its plain meaning if
it is possible to do so. 15
2. Exceptions, limitations, and exclusions to coverage should be
interpreted narrowly.16
3. An insurance policy should be read as a layman would read it and
not as it might be analyzed by an attorney or an insurance expert.17
12 3 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACnCE App. A at 41-158 (1991).
13 Id. App. D at 41-170.
14 Id.
15 Unified School Dist. No. 501 v. Continental Casualty Co., 723 F. Supp. 564, 566
(D. Kan. 1989); see Nichols v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 169 Cal. App. 3d 766, 775, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 416, 421 (1985) ("Absent a clear indication to the contrary, words in an insurance
policy are to be read in their plain and ordinary sense."); First Ins. Co. v. State, 66 Haw.
413, 424, 665 P.2d 648, 655 (1983) (insurance policy terms "should be interpreted
according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech... ").
16 Traders State Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 280, 283 (10th Cir. 1969);
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 406, 770 P.2d 704, 710, 257
Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 (1989).
17 Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 5 Cal. 3d 112, 115, 485 P.2d 1129,
1130, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1971); Griffin v. Maryland Casualty Co., 213 Miss. 624,
632, 57 So. 2d 486, 489 (1952) (ambiguous language in insurance policies "should be
construed most strongly in favor of the insured").
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4. Insurance policy language should be construed to protect the
reasonable expectations of the insured. Any ambiguity in an insurance
policy is to be resolved against the insurance carrier.18
5. To protect the insured's expectation of coverage, an insurance
policy should be given an interpretation that is "semantically
permissible" and will "fairly achieve [the policy's] object of providing
indemnity for the loss to which the insurance relates."' 9
In spite of these well-established principles, insurance carriers typically
argue that if insurance policy language is ambiguous, it should not
automatically be interpreted against the carrier. The insurance carriers argue
that many corporate insureds are Fortune 500 companies, have substantial
bargaining power, have sophisticated risk managers, use large insurance
brokers in the procurement of policies, and actually have been able to negotiate
particular policy language. They cite two cases to support their arguments:
Garcia v. Truck Insurance Exchange2" and Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v.
Fibreboard Corp.21 The insurance carriers' argument, however, should be
rejected. These cases are neither controlling nor persuasive in most contexts.
In Garcia, there was evidence that the insured negotiated and jointly
drafted the policy terms in question. In most cases, such evidence will be
lacking. Thus, Garcia's impact, if any, should be limited to situations
involving substantially similar facts. 22 In Fibreboard, unlike the common
situation, the insured actually drafted and proposed the particular language at
issue.
In most situations, the insurance carrier, or an insurance industry
organization, such as the Insurance Services Office ("ISO'), will have drafted
the insurance policy language. Even if an insurance broker negotiated the
18 Royal College Shop, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 670, 674 (10th Cir.
1990); Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 5 Cal. 3d 112, 115, 485 P.2d 1129,
1130, 95 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1971).
19 Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 699, 701, 493 P.2d 861, 862, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 134 (1972).
20 36 Cal. 3d 426, 438, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105, 204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1984)
(ambiguity not construed against insurance carrier when insured negotiated terms of policy,
language was jointly drafted, and insured had substantial bargaining power).
21 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467-68, 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 (1986) (ambiguity not
construed against insurance carrier when insured "proposed or drafted" the exclusion at
issue).
22 See In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coord. Proceed. No.
1072, Statement of Decision Concerning Phase I Issues, slip op. at 55 (Cal. San Francisco
Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990) (Garcia does not "hold that the mere size of the insured changes
the time-honored rule that ambiguous language be construed against the insurer and in favor
of coverage."), appeals docketed, No. A049419.
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relevant language or participated in its drafting, there is a question as to
whether the broker was acting as an agent for the insured or the carrier.
Therefore, it is not surprising that many courts have rejected the insurance
carriers' arguments. As the California Supreme Court recently explained:
We deem [the party who drafted the policy language in question] to be the
insurers. They have presented no evidence suggesting that the provisions in
question were actually negotiated or jointly drafted.... Indeed, the evidence
that is before us reveals that such provisions, drafted by the insurers, are highly
uniform in content and wording. For the above reasons, we interpret their
contents, if ambiguous, in favor of coverage.23
Furthermore, the insurance carriers' arguments do not reflect their own
business practices and procedures. Insurance carriers argue that a court cannot
interpret insurance language or rule on potentially dispositive motions, such as
summary adjudication motions, without considering the insured's size and
sophistication and its use of insurance brokers. In fact, insurance carriers do
not consider these factors in interpreting insurance policies when making their
decisions on claims. The following is a typical example of testimony by
insurance carrier claims representatives on this subject:
Q. So when you are looking at policy language you go by the language and not
by how big or little the insured is?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Does it make any difference whether or not an insurance broker was
involved in procuring the policy as to how you interpret the policy language?
A. No.
Q. Again, you go by what the policy language says?
A. Yes.
Q. Does it make any difference to you whether or not particular policy
language was negotiated insofar as interpreting that policy language?
A. No.
23 AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 823-24, 799 P.2d 1253, 1265-66,
274 Cal. Rptr. 820, 832-33 (1990). As the court also explained:
These provisions... are adopted verbatim from standard form policies used
throughout the country. For this reason, even if the policies were "negotiated" in a
broad sense, this fact has little bearing on construction of the specific policy
language in question here.
Id. at 823 n.9.
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Q. And, again, you go by what the policy language says?
A. Yes.24
This testimony creates a problem for insurance carriers. On the one hand,
if what the insurance carriers tell courts is correct, then their claims
representatives have inappropriately decided to deny coverage because they did
not consider the insured's size, sophistication, use of an insurance broker, or
involvement in negotiations. In making coverage determinations without this
"necessary" information, the insurance carriers may be breaching contractual
and statutory obligations. On the other hand, if, as claims representatives
testify, this information is not relevant in making a coverage determination,
then insurance carriers' representations to the contrary in court are misleading.
Thus, courts should continue to reject the insurance carriers' arguments.
There is nro "sophisticated insured" exception generally applicable to the rules
governing insurance policy interpretation.
III. POLLUTION CLEANUP COSTS AS INSURED "DAMAGES"
As noted above, the typical CGL policy requires the insurance carrier to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage that occurs
during the policy period. One of the most heavily contested questions in the
disputes between insurance carriers and insureds is whether the term "damages"
includes costs incurred by, or imposed on, the insured for cleaning up the
environment. More than 100 courts (primarily trial courts) have decided this
issue nationally. While insureds have prevailed in most of these decisions, 25
insurance carriers still press the battle.
24 Transcript of Deposition of Patrick A. Pisano (Zonal Claim Manager, Chubb &
Son, Inc.) at 44-45, Northrop Corp. v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. C566129 (Cal. Los Angeles
Super. Ct. July 19, 1989).
25 See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.
1989); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng. Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388
S.E.2d 557 (1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d
507 (1990). But see, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
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A. The Plain Meaning of Insurance Policy Language
Many courts have held that cleanup costs are "damages" within the plain
meaning of the CGL policy language.26 In spite of this fact, insurance carriers
typically argue that the CGL policies are not ambiguous and that they should be
interpreted in accord with their plain meaning. They also argue that while the
term "damages" includes monetary compensation for injury, it does not include
equitable remedies, such as the costs of complying with injunctions. The
insurance carriers argue that costs incurred under CERCLA are like injunctive
costs and are, therefore, not "damages."
However, dictionaries-the source usually used by courts to determine a
word's "plain meaning"27- define the term "damages" broadly, without
technical distinctions. "Damages"is defined in one dictionary as:
1: Loss or harm resulting from injury to person, property, or reputation.
2: pl: compensation in money imposed by law for loss or injury.
3: Expense, cost.28
Thus, it is not surprising that courts have rejected the insurance carriers'
proffered "plain meaning" in favor of the "plain meaning" urged by insureds.
According to the Washington Supreme Court:
The plain, ordinary meaning of damages as defined by the dictionary
defeats [the] insurers' argument. Standard dictionaries uniformly define the
word "damages" inclusively, without making any distinction between sums
awarded on a "legal" or "equitable" claim.... Indeed, even the insurers' own
dictionaries define "damages" in accordance with the ordinary, popular, lay
understanding.... Even a policyholder with an insurance dictionary at hand
would not learn about the coverage-restricting connotation to "damages" that
the insurers argue is obvious.29
26 See, e.g., National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 765, 766-67 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 560 (D. Del. 1989).
27 See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 537 n.5, 226
Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 n.5 (1986); Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 409, 412
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Davis, 44 Wash. App. 161,721 P.2d 550 (1986).
28 WEBTE's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICMIONARY 323 (1986).
29 Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 877-78, 784 P.2d
507,511 (1990).
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B. The FMC Decision
In 1990, the California Supreme Court rendered its decision in AIU
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.30 This is likely to be an influential decision
because the insurance industry aggressively argued the case3l and because the
California Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of California's long-
established pro-coverage principles of insurance policy interpretation. The
court held that CGL policies "cover the costs of reimbursing government
agencies and complying with injunctions ordering cleanup under CERCLA and
similar statutes." 32 The court also held:
[E]ven if government response costs are incurred largely to prevent damage
previously confined to the insured's property from spreading to government or
third party property (i.e., the costs are "mitigative" in character),
reimbursement of such costs constitutes "damages" in ordinary terms. A
contrary result would fail to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties.3 3
The court also rejected the insurance carriers' arguments that the policies
issued before enactment of CERCLA do not cover liabilities created by
CERCLA. The court noted that because the policies were "comprehensive"
liability policies, "it was.within the insured's reasonable expectation that new
types of statutory liability would be covered ... .-34
C. The Insurance Indusny Intended to Cover Environmental Liabilities
and Costs of Cleaning Up Environmental Contamination
The drafting history of the standard form CGL policy demonstrates that
insurance carriers intended to provide coverage for environmental cleanup
costs. For example, Lyman J. Baldwin, Jr., an employee of the Insurance
Company of North America and a member of the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters General Liability Rating Committee, stated, in discussing the
1966 standard form policy:
Let us consider... a fairly commonplace situation where we have a chemical
manufacturing plant which during the course of its operations emits noxious
30 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990).
31 More than 100 insurance companies and underwriters were defendants in the case,
numerous amicus curiae briefs were filed, and the Insurance Environmental Litigation
Association vigorously briefed and argued the issues before the California Supreme Court.
3 2 A/UIns. Co., 51 Cal. 3d at 814, 799 P.2d at 1259, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
33 Id. at 833, 799 P.2d at 1272, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
3 4 Id. at 822 n.8, 799 P.2d at 1264 n.8, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.8.
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fumes that damage the paint on buildings in the surrounding neighborhood.
Under the new policy there is coverage until such time as the insured becomes
aware that the damage was being done.35
Likewise, Gilbert L. Bean of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company also
discussed the industry's intent, describing some of the environmental claims
that would be covered under the 1966 standard form CGL policy:
Coverage for gradual BI [bodily injury] or gradual PD [property damage]
resulting over a period of time from exposure to the insured's waste disposal.
Examples would be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or stream
pollution, contamination of water supply or vegetation. We are all aware of
cases such as contamination of oyster beds, lint in the water intake of down-
stream industrial sites, the Donora, Pa. atmospheric contamination, and the
like.3 6
Given the intent of the drafters of the language contained in the standard CGL
policy language, there is a strong evidentiary foundation supporting the many
court decisions holding that CGL policies insure the costs of pollution cleanup.
IV. THE EXCLUSION FOR DAMAGE "EXPECTED OR INTENDED" BY THE
INSURED
Many insurance carriers argue in court that their corporate insureds
intended to pollute and to damage the environment, while the insurance carriers
never intended to insure pollution-related damage. These insurance carriers
urge the courts to rule that they need not pay for the intentional acts of their
insureds and for damage that the insureds expected. This argument is premised
upon an "expected or intended" exclusion found in the "occurrence" definition
of the 1966 and 1973 standard form CGL policies. These policies define
"occurrence" as "[a]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."37
35 Address by Lyman J. Baldwin, Jr. to American Society of Insurance Management
6 (October 20, 1965), Trial Ex. No. 1087, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judicial
Council Coord. Proceed. No. 1072 (Cal. San Francisco Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), appeals
docketed, No. A049419.
36 Gilbert L. Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under New CGL Policies
With Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible 1 (1966) (emphasis added),
Trial Ex. No. 1084, id.
37 3 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrIcE § 49.04[2] (1991) (emphasis
added). In subsequent versions of the standard form CGL policy, the "expected or intended"
language is found in a separate exclusion. For example, the 1987 "occurrence" and "claims
made" CGL policies prepared by the Insurance Services Office contain an exclusion stating:
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The insurance carriers argue that coverage is excluded if an insured
intended an act that results in damage or if the consequences of the act were
reasonably foreseeable to someone, even if they were not foreseen by the
insured. They seek to prove too much, however, by arguing that all pollution-
related damage is expected and intended.
A. Insurance Carriers Bear the Burden of Proving That Their Insured's
Conduct and Intent Was Wrongful
As a general rule, the insured has the burden of establishing that its claim
falls within the basic parameters of coverage, while an insurance carrier has the
burden of establishing the applicability of an exculpatory clause.38
In aemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co., 3 9 the California Supreme Court
analyzed the issue of which party bears the burden of proof with respect to a
policy exclusion providing that coverage was not applicable "to any act
committed by... the insured with intent to cause personal injury." 40 The
court concluded that the carrier had the burden of proving that the insured
acted with the intent to cause personal injury. As the court explained, "the
burden of bringing itself within any exculpatory clause contained in the policy
is on the insurer."41
This insurance does not apply to:
a. "Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury"
resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.
Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy Form, reprinted
in K. PASIcH, CAsuArY AND ULABiLrry INsURANcE 2-1 & 3-2 (1991).3 8 See Masonite Corp. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d 912,
922 n.7, 274 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212 n.7 (1990) ("The insured has the burden of proving the
contract of insurance and its terms, but the insurer bears the burden of bringing itself within
an exculpatory clause contained in an insurance policy."); Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Mendez, 213 Cal. App. 3d 41, 47, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (1989) ("[The burden is on the
insured initially to prove an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage ....
The burden then shifts to the insurer to prove the claim falls within an exclusion.")
39 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).40 Id. at 873 n.5, 587 P.2d at 1101 n.5, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 288 n.5.
41 Id. at 880. The court cited California Evidence Code section 520 in support of its
conclusion. Section 520 provides that "[tihe party claiming that a person is guilty of crime
or wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue." Thus, to the extent that an element of
wrongdoing is the basis for an insurance carrier's claim of non-coverage, the insurance
carrier should bear the burden of proof, even if the applicable policy language is contained
in an insuring agreement rather than in an exclusion.
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Many other courts have reached the same conclusion. For example, in In
re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,42 the court concluded that insurance
carriers bear the burden of proving that bodily injury was "either expected or
intended." 43 As the court explained, "to place the burden on the insured would
exalt form over substance and ignore the fundamental effect of the language."44
As the court also explained:
The purpose and function of the instant clause is to limit coverage, i.e., to
define a risk which is excepted from coverage. Inasmuch as it flmctions as a
limitation on the liability of the insurer, it must be treated in the same manner
as other provisos, exceptions, and exclusions in the policies. As such, the
burden of proving that the [damage] was either expected or intended is on the
insurer.45
B. "Intentional" Conduct Requires an Intent to Cause Damage, Not
Simply the Intent to do an Act That Results in Damage
1. Negligence or Reckless Conduct Is Not Enough
Before an insurance carrier can show that conduct is excluded "intentional
conduct," it must prove that there was, in fact, intentional conduct committed
by the insured. Indeed, many insurance carriers have conceded this. In a brief
recently filed in Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Insurance Co.,46 a group
of insurance carriers stated:
On one extreme are a few courts that have defined "expected or intended"
to mean damage that is reasonably foreseeable by the insured .. [T]his
standard is indistinguishable from negligence and is therefore inconsistent with
liability insurance which is purchased by insureds as protection against liability
for negligence. 47
42 Judicial Council Coord. Proceed. No. 1072, Statement of Decision Concerning
Phase III Issues 68 (Cal. San Francisco Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), appeals docketed, No.
A049419.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. (citations omitted). See also Roe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 188 Ga.
App. 368, 370, 373 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1988) ("the burden will be on the insurer to prove that
the insured expected or intended bodily injury.. ."). In later standard form policies, where
the "expected or intended" language is set forth in an express exclusion, the burden clearly
rests upon the insurance carrier to prove that injury or damage was "expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured."
46 App. Civ. No. A045544 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991).
47 Id. Respondents' Joint Brief at 23 (March 5, 1991) (note omitted). The carriers on
whose behalf the brief was filed include AIU Insurance Company, Aetna Casualty & Surety
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As a result, even if injury is an ordinary consequence of a negligent act,
coverage will not be excluded. An example provided by one court demonstrates
this point:
An ordinary consequence of driving an automobile without the exercise of
ordinary care or an intentional violation of a statute (speed in excess of the
maximum speed limit), is injury to the person or property of the driver or a
third person. Certainly no one would contend that an injury occasioned by
negligent or even reckless driving was not accidental within the meaning of a
policy of accident insurance.. .. 48
Therefore, negligence and reckless conduct are insurable and are not
excluded from coverage by the "expected or intended" exclusion. Indeed, the
"expected or intended" exclusion itself speaks in terms of the resulting property
damage or bodily injury being expected or intended, not in terms of the act
being expected or intended. Thus, the exclusion should not apply unless an
insurance carrier proves that the damage or injury, rather than the act, was
"expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."
2. Conduct Is Excluded 'ntentional"Conduct Only If Insurance Carriers
Can Prove That an Insured Had a Preconceived Design to Inflict Harm
a. The Insurance Industry Intended to Exclude Intentional Conduct from
Coverage Only If an Insured Intended Wrongful Consequences to Result
from Its Acts
Many insurance carriers argue that they need not prove that the particular
insured intended to cause damage by its actions. Instead, they contend that they
need to show only that the damage was foreseeable or could reasonably have
been expected to occur. By advancing these arguments, however, insurance
Company, American Motorists Insurance Company, California Union Insurance Company,
Centennial Insurance Company, Columbia Casualty Company, Commercial Union
Insurance Companies, Continental Casualty Company, Employers Mutual Casualty
Company, Federal Insurance Company, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Froude and Companies (of the London market), Great
American Insurance Company, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., Home Insurance
Company, Insurance Company of North America, International Surplus Lines Insurance
Company, Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, the North River Insurance Company,
Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company, North Star Reinsurance Company,
Pacific Indemnity Company, Prudential Reinsurance Company, St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, and United States Fire Insurance Company.
48 Meyer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 327, 43 Cal. Rptr.
542, 546 (1965).
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carriers are attempting to get courts to impose specific restrictions on their
policy obligations that the insurance industry often has rejected for more than
twenty years.
The "occurrence" definition with its "expected or intended" exclusion was
added to the standard form CGL policy in 1966 when the basis of coverage
was changed from an "accident" to an "occurrence." The "expected or
intended" exclusion in the definition of "occurrence" replaced the intentional
injury exclusions that were contained in the "accident" policies issued before
1966. At the same time the drafters of the standard form CGL policy were
considering this "expected or intended" exclusion, they considered alternative
language as well. This alternative language focused on an objective test of
coverage, rather than the subjective test of the "expected or intended"
exclusion. It was suggested as part of an exclusion stating: "This policy does
not apply to bodily injury or property damage resulting from deliberate acts or
omissions of the insured which with reasonable certainty may be expected to
produce injury or damage."49 This language was rejected in favor of the
"expected or intended" exclusion. As Herbert Schoen, one of the key drafters of
the policy language, has testified, this "reasonable certainty" language was
rejected because it "was too rough to inflict upon. . . insureds and would lead
to the demand of its deletion." 50 As Mr. Schoen further explained, the only
thing that the drafters sought to exclude from coverage was "the intentional
results of intentional act[s], such as murder. We didn't want to cover that. That
is an intentional act with an intentional result."51
Another insurance company representative similarly explained the effect of
the "expected or intended" exclusion in 1966. Willard Obrist, then an assistant
manager of the General Accident Group, stated: "[lInstances arise when the
injury is an unintended result of an intentional act. The two situations, an
absence of intent or an unexpected result, would be covered under either the
'accident' or 'occurrence' definition."52
After the 1966 standard form CGL policy was introduced, a representative
of Johnson & Higgins, an insurance broker, surveyed insurance carriers to seek
49 Minutes of the Joint Forms Committee (May 2-4, 1961) (emphasis added), Trial
Exhibit No. 977, at 9, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Cal. Judicial Council Coord.
Proceed. No. 1072 (Cal. San Francisco Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), appeals docketed, No.
A049419.50 Trial Transcript 15901 (Mar. 4, 1986), In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases.
51 Id. at 15902.
52 Willard J. Obrist, The New Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy: A
Coverage Analysis 6-7 (Nov. 1966); see also George Katz, "Why the New Liability Policy,"
Reprint of Speech, Mhe New Liability Policy: Some Highlights 4 (undated), Trial Exhibit
No. 1131, at 4, id. ("An occurrence as defined includes the infliction of intentional injury,
provided the insured (that is the person against whom claim is being made) did not intend or
expect it.")
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their explanations of various policy provisions, including the "expected or
intended"language. In response, Travelers Insurance Company stated:
We do not anticipate any problems with the phrase "neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." Certainly, we will never use the
language to deny coverage where the foreseeability of the injury was no more
than an element of proof of negligence as this would mean that the liability
policy would not cover liability for negligence. The language obliges us to
judge coverage from the standpoint of the insured claiming coverage .... 53
Employers Mutual of Wausau responded to Johnson & Higgins' inquiry as
follows:
You ask whether or not we will use the "reasonable man test" in determining
whether the insured should have expected the injury rather than determining
whether such injury was in fact expected. The definition of occurrence does not
provide for the "reasonable man test." Thus, the test will be whether such
injury was in fact erpected.54
The Hartford Insurance Group also provided its understanding of the meaning
of the term "expected," stating that the term means "expected for a certainty." 55
More than a decade later, the insurance industry again considered adopting
an "objective"or "foreseeability" standard for assessing when injury is expected
or intended. In 1977, an exclusion was proposed before an ISO committee that
would have excluded coverage for "injury expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured or reasonably certain to occur as a result of the
intended act." This language was designed to make the exclusion "more
objective and more enforceable than the previous language because it adds a
new element to this exclusion, i.e., the third party's viewpoint in addition to the
first party's viewpoint which is purely subjective."56
While the Ad Hoe Committee concurred with the proposal, the "reasonably
certain" language was rejected in favor of "substantially certain to occur"
language.57 This language, however, was also rejected. As ISO's Ad Hoe
Legal Review Committee noted: "The basic exclusion of expected or intended
53 Letter from R. J. Fisher to Robert F. Bauer (Aug. 19, 1966), Trial Ex. No. 2216,
In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases.
54 Letter from lack W. Carroll to Robert F. Bauer (Aug. 19, 1966), Trial Ex. No.
2218, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases (emphasis added).
55 Letter from Harold Schaffher to Robert F. Bauer (Aug. 25, 1966), Trial Ex. No.
2219, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases.
56 Minutes of the Ad Hoe Committee on Special Comprehensive Forms and Rules at
3 (May 3-5, 1977) (emphasis added).
57 See Agenda, Executive Committee (Insurance Services Office), Meeting of March
3, 1981.
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events should not be extended by this new provision, which can be interpreted
so broadly as to deny product coverage in many circumstances."58
The insurance industry specifically considered, and rejected, the "objective"
foreseeability test, recognizing that that test would eliminate coverage for even
simple acts of negligence. Courts should do the same.
b. Courts Generally Have Concluded That Coverage Is Excluded Only If
the Insured Intended Wrongful Consequences from Its Acts
A number of courts have addressed the question of what constitutes
"expected or intended" bodily injury and property damage within the purview
of the "expected or intended" exclusion. In a recent decision, the Kentucky
Supreme Court explained the majority view:
The [insured] is entitled to coverage under its policies unless it has specific and
subjective intent to cause the pollution giving rise to the CERCLA claims. The
"expected or intended" exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically
and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim. Partons-Oxford
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dodge, Me., 426 A.2d 888 (1980). We believe this
to be the majority rule, and we agree that if injury was not actually and
subjectively intended or expected by the insured, coverage is provided even
though the action giving rise to the injury itself was intentional and the injury
foreseeable.... While the activity which produced the alleged damage may be
fully intended, recovery will not be allowed unless the insured intended the
resulting damages. 59
A California trial court, after considering an extensive record regarding the
intent of the drafters of the language, reached essentially the same conclusion.
In In re Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,60 the court addressed the question
of the meaning of the "expected or intended" language. The court first
addressed the question in the abstract, determining the appropriate legal
standard, which it then applied to a particular factual context. As the court
explained, it interpreted the language in the abstract "to determine what level of
likelihood, knowledge, or intent is necessary on the part of the insured in order
for coverage to be precluded by the clause." 61 The court then rejected various
58 Ad Hoc Legal Review Committee, March 13, 1981, Meeting with Representatives
of the General Liability Committee, Tentative Conclusions 5.
59 James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814
S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (citation omitted), as mo&fied (Sept. 26, 1991).
60 Cal. Judicial Council Coord. Proceed. No. 1072, Statement of Decision
Concerning Phase I[ Issues (Cal. San Francisco Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), appeals
docketed, No. A049419.
61 Id. at 67-68.
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positions asserted by the parties on the grounds that none of the positions
accurately or completely stated the law concerning the meaning of the clause. 62
After considering the drafting history behind the "expected or intended"
language and the arguments advanced by the parties, the court held:
This Court determines that the "neither expected nor intended" clause
applies where the insured acted either wilfully, intentionally, or maliciously for
the purpose of causing injury. The intent behind the act in question must
involve an element of wrongfulness or misconduct....
One final clarification on the standard is in order. An insurer is not
required to produce express testimony or documentation as to an insured's
subjective, wrongful intent to cause injury, but may show that reason mandates
that by the very nature of the act undertaken, coupled with the knowledge
actually in possession of the insured, harm must have been intended. This
clarification accords with the language of the policy, which speaks in terms of
what was "expected or intended," and not in terms of what should have been
"expected or intended." 63
In so holding, the court noted that its standard "accords with that adopted in the
majority of jurisdictions that have ruled upon this question." 64
A federal court of appeals addressed this subject in the context of insurance
coverage for environmental claims. In City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard
Insurance Co.,65 the insured owned and operated a landfill that allegedly leaked
into the groundwater. The State of New York sued under CERCLA. When the
insured tendered the claim to its insurance carriers, they disclaimed coverage
and asserted that the damage was "expected or intended" by the insured. The
carriers argued that because the insured had notice that the landfill was leaking
into the groundwater, the damage was "expected or intended" by the insured.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating:
62 The court summarized the positions advanced by the various parties as follows:
The parties urge various meanings as the proper interpretation of the language in
question. The policyholders contend that the clause is ambiguous and excludes
coverage only if the insurer proves that the insured actually intended that a particular
claimant suffer personal injury. Some insurers contend that coverage is barred by the
clause if the act undertaken by the policyholder was intended, without regard to whether
the policyholder intended to injure any particular claimant. Other insurers urge that the
term "expected" must be given a meaning independent of "intended" so as to bar
coverage when the resultant damage is a "substantial probability," or is "likely," or is
"highly expectable."
Id. at 69.
63 Id. at 69-70 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64 Id. at 71.
65 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
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In general, what makes injuries or damages expected or intended rather than
accidental are the knowledge and intent of the insured. It is not enough that an
insured was warned that damages might ensue from its actions, or that, once
warned, an insured decided to take a calculated risk and proceed as before.
Recovery will be barred only if the insured intended the damages, or if it can
be said that the damages were, in a broader sense, "intended"by the insured
because the insured knew that the damages would flow directly and
immediately from its intentional act.66
The court also determined that the "notice" received by the insured prior to the
CERCLA action did not support the carriers' argument of intentional conduct:
[P]roof of warnings of possible physical damages is not enough to show that as
a matter of law the damages ultimately incurred were expected or intended.
In opting to keep the landfill in operation, the City took a calculated risk....
Here, ... the record suggests that the City was aware of potential
contamination, but not that the City intended the resulting damage, nor that the
City intending harm, /mew that the extensive damages alleged in the CERCLA
complaint would flow directly and immediately from the City's intentional
acts.6
7
66 Id. at 1150 (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 1152. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So. 2d 921, 925 (Ala. 1984) ("the policy
term 'expected or intended' injury, cannot be equated with foreseeable injury"); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Colangione, 107 A.D.2d 978, 979, 484 N.Y.S.2d 929, 931 (1985) ("to deny
coverage, then, the fact finder must find that the insured intended to cause damage.");
McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 363, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489, 329
N.E.2d 172, 175 (1975) ("Certainly one may intend to run a red light, but not intend that
the catastrophic result of collision with another car occur. Calculated risks can result in
accidents.")
As one court explained:
The word "reasonable" is not employed in the exclusion in question and we
reject Aetna's plea that we read in a reasonableness standard. It was Aetna which
drafted the policy and if it wanted an objective standard to apply, it could have
drafted its policy accordingly.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Dichtl, 78 IM. App. 3d 970, 977, 398 N.E.2d 582, 588
(1979). The court also noted that the phrase "from the standpoint of the insured" (contained
within the "expected and intended" language) supported its conclusion that it was the
insured's subjective intent that was relevant, not some reasonableness standard:
[B]y referencing the insured, as opposed to a hypothetical reasonable man,
this phrase, if anything, supports our imposition of a subjective or personal
standard.
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In fact, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals long ago
recognized the flaws inherent in the arguments now advanced by insurance
carriers. As the Tenth Circuit reasoned:
[I]f the policy did not cover the loss because the natural and probable
consequences of the negligent act did not constitute an accident, then by the
same logic, there would be no liability where the damage was the unexpected,
hence unforeseen result of the negligent act. In the first instance, the damage
would be foreseeable and therefore not accidental; in the latter instance, the
damage would not be foreseeable and hence no liability upon the insured for
his negligent acts. In either instance, the insurer would be free of coverage and
the policy would be rendered meaningless. 68
While a few courts have accepted the insurance carriers' efforts to broaden
the scope of the "expected or intended" exclusion to include damage that was
not actually expected by the insured, the majority of courts have not done so.
Courts that face this issue in the future should do what the majority of courts
have done-honor the drafting intent and the plain meaning of the policy
language. Insurance coverage should be excluded only if an insured actually
expects, to a very high degree of certainty, that property damage or bodily
injury will directly result from its actions. If courts take this approach,
coverage will not often be excluded. As Maurice Greenberg, the President and
CEO of American International Group, Incorporated, one of the largest groups
of insurance carriers, has explained:
We should also recognize that, in the majority of cases, [the] companies [now
being held responsible for environmental damage] were not acting in a
deliberate or irresponsible way. At the time, they were not aware of the future
consequences of their waste disposal practices. And business was not alone in
this ignorance. Otherwise, federal, state, and local government would have
enacted laws to govern the handling and disposal of waste. It is, therefore,
understandable, that companies should now bridle at being held responsible for
actions that occurred long in the past and which were not illegal, deliberate, or
irresponsible at the time.69
Id.
68 Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894
(10th Cir. 1957); see City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052,
1058 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Under Aetna's construction of the policy language if the damage was
foreseeable then the insured is liable. This is not the law. The function of an insurance
company is more than that of premium receiver.")
69 Greenberg, Finandng the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: The National
Environmental Trust Fund, 1 ENvrT'L CLAIMS J. 421,423 (1989).
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Likewise, one court has commented:
The history of coverage and the history of pollution damage alleged in this case
goes back 40 to 50 years. As a matter of reality, most of the damage that [the
insured] has now been charged with cleaning up was done by it during a period
of time when the scientific community had very little knowledge of the
overwhelmingly disasterous [sic] effects that this chemical pollution would
have. It was not known, for example, how quickly chemicals would leech [sic]
from an evaporation pond into the aquifir [sic] underlying the pond and seep
from there into adjoining and far distant properties. 7 0
C. Indemnification of a Corporate Insured Is Barred Only If the
Policymaking Level of Management Acted with the Requisite Malevolent
Intent
In the case of a corporate insured, the question of whether the
corporation's conduct is excluded "intentional" conduct cannot be answered
simply by the insurance carrier proving that someone at the corporation
intended the wrongful consequences of an act. Insurance coverage for a
corporate insured is barred only if the policymaking level of management acted
with the requisite malevolent intent.
The drafters of the 1966 standard form CGL policy clearly intended that
coverage would be barred under the "expected or intended" clause of the
"occurrence" definition only if the policymaking levels of management intended
to cause the injury. George Katz, of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company-one
of the principal drafters of the 1966 standard form CGL policy-explained the
insurance industry's intent in response to inquiries of Johnson & Higgins:
In order to deny the corporation coverage on the ground that it expected or
intended the injury which gave rise to the claim, we would have to show that
the level of management responsible for making policy with regard to the act
or omission causing the occurrence expected or intended that injury would
result .... We also intend to cover other kinds of injury resulting from
intentional acts of employees unless such acts are known to and condoned by
or directed by those officials of the corporation responsible for the action of the
employee that gave rise to the injury or damage. 7 1
70 Memorandum of Intended Decision on Motion of Certain Defendants for
Adjudication that CERCLA Clean-Up Costs Do Not Constitute Damages 14, FMC Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058, slip op. at 14 (Cal. Santa Clara Super. Ct. Jan. 3,
1989).
71 Letter from George Katz of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. to Robert F. Bauer of
Johnson & I-Iggins (Aug. 31, 1966), Trial Ex. No. 1136, at 5, In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage
Cases, Cal. Judicial Council Coord. Proceed. No. 1072 (Cal. San Francisco Super. Ct. Jan.
24, 1990), appeals docketed, No. A049419.
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Courts also have concluded in analogous contexts that insurance coverage
for a corporation is not excluded just because a corporate employee
intentionally acted to cause damage. For example, in Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co. v. City of Turlock,72 the court addressed the issue of the applicability of
California Insurance Code section 533 to an employer's vicarious liability for
the willful fraud of its employee. The court concluded that section 533, which
prohibits insurance coverage for a loss caused by the insured's willful act, 73
does not bar indemnity for vicarious liability based upon the willful fraud of an
employee not acting in a "managerial capacity. "74
A similar conclusion was reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Dart Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.75 In Dart, the court held
that coverage for damages in a libel action was not barred by section 533,
despite the fact that the libel was the result of the willful act of the corporate
president, acting within the course and scope of his responsibilities. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that section 533 would not apply without
a showing that the board of directors or other senior management authorized or
ratified the libelous act.76
V. POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS
Beginning in the early 1970s, the insurance industry introduced a form
pollution exclusion that is now known as the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion. The "sudden and accidental"pollution exclusion reads as follows:
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
72 170 Cal. App. 3d 988, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1985).
73 California Insurance Code section 533 states that "[a]n insurer is not liable for a
loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the
insured, or of the insured's agents or others."
74 170 Cal. App. 3d at 1001; see also California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau
v. Carter, 164 Cal. App. 3d 257, 263, 210 Cal. Rptr. 140, 144 (1985) (noting in dicta that
"[a]n exception to a bar to indemnification for intentional acts under Section 533 is found
when an insured is held vicariously liable for compensatory damages caused by another's
wilful tort"); Arenson v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 83, 286 P.2d
816, 818 (1955) (exclusion for injuries "caused intentionally by or at the direction of the
insured"would not preclude coverage for a parent's vicarious liability for injuries willfully
caused by a child, even though the child was an additional named insured).
75 484 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1973).
76 Id. at 1298-99.
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pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of
water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and accidental. 77
Later the insurance industry issued an "absolute" pollution exclusion.
While there are many variations of this "absolute" pollution exclusion, most
track the language of the 1982 ISO form exclusion. This form exclusion
purports to exclude coverage for "'bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising
out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
pollutants .... " 78 The "sudden and accidental" and "absolute" exclusions do
not, however, completely eliminate coverage for pollution claims.
A. The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
When the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion was introduced on
behalf of the insurance industry, it was represented to be "a clarification of the
original intent," as expressed in the definition of the term "occurrence." 79 The
insurance industry, however, now contends that the "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion was not just a clarification of language in earlier policies,
but is instead a broad exclusion that eliminates most coverage for pollution-
related damage. As is shown below, this interpretation is not supportable.
Instead, the exclusion operates only to eliminate coverage in a narrow range of
circumstances.
1. "Sudden and Accidental" Should Be Interpreted as a Clarification of
the 'Expected or Intended" Exclusion, Not as a Temporal Restriction on
Coverage
While courts have reached varying conclusions on the meaning of the
phrase "sudden and accidental," a growing majority of courts and the better
reasoned decisions have concluded that the phrase "sudden and accidental"
clarifies the "neither expected nor intended" language contained in the
"occurrence" definition. This conclusion is sound, given the plain meaning of
77 Insuance Services Office, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance (Ed. 1-73).
78 Insurance Services Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy
Form (Occurrence) (1982), repuinted in K. PASICH, CASUALTY AND LIABILrrY
INSURANCE, Form 2-2 (1991).
79 See Letter from Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau to Hon. Samuel H. Weese,
Insurance Commissioner (July 30, 1970), Ex. 9 to Declaration of David W. Steuber in
Support of Motion of FMC Corporation for Partial Summary Adjudication of Issues
Respecting Certain Policies Issued By Defendants on Grounds of Judicial Estoppel and
Collateral Estoppel, FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058 (Cal. Santa Clara
Super. Ct., motion filed Sept. 26, 1988).
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the words "sudden" and "accidental" and the general rule that ambiguous
language is to be interpreted in favor of coverage.
Courts throughout the United States have recognized that an appropriate
manner to determine the meaning of undefined insurance policy terms is to
consult a dictionary.80 Many dictionaries define "sudden; when used as an
adjective as meaning "happening or coming unexpectedly" and when used as a
noun as meaning "an unexpected occurrence." 81 Thesauruses also include
"unexpected" and "unpremeditated" as synonyms for "sudden."82 Many
dictionaries also define "accidental" as "occurring unexpectedly or by chance,"
"happening without intent or through carelessness and often with unfortunate
results." 83 And thesauruses include "chance" and "fortuity" as synonyms of
"accident,"while listing "design, INTENTION"as antonyms. 84
These and similar definitions have led many courts to conclude that
"sudden and accidental" should be interpreted to mean "neither expected nor
intended." As one court explained, the dictionary definition of "sudden" "is
consistent with the common meaning of the word in everyday parlance." 85 As
another court observed, "sudden"and "accidental"reasonably can be interpreted
to mean "neither expected nor intended." 86 These considerations led the
Georgia Supreme Court to conclude that, "even in its popular usage, 'sudden'
does not usually describe the duration of an event, but rather its
unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death." 87
The "sudden and accidental" language "simply [is] a restatement of. the
definition of 'occurrence.'" 88 As a result, "applicability of the exception to the
pollution clause is not precluded by a long-term or continuous
exposure .... [D]amage caused by accidental or even ordinarily negligent
polluters who neither intend nor expect the ensuing damage is indemniflable
despite long-term and repeated polluting activity." 89 Damage caused by gradual
pollution is covered so long as that damage was not expected or intended by the
80 See supra note 27.
81 See, e.g., WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE Dc'IONARY 1155 (1980).
82 See, e.g., THE NEW AMERICAN ROGEr'S COLLEGE THESAURUS 49 (1978).
83 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 7 (1980).
84 See THE NEW AMERICAN ROGEr's COLLEGE THESAURUS 6 (1978).
85 Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516,
530-31, 528 A.2d 76, 83 (1987).
86 See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359,
1362-63 (D. Del. 1987).
87 See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 335, 380 S.E.2d 686,
688 (1989).
88 Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 752, 456 N.W.2d 570, 575
(1990).
89 Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 236 N.J. Super. 349, 357, 565
A.2d 1113, 1117 (App. Div. 1989).
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insured. 90 Thus, many courts have interpreted "sudden and accidental" as it
should be interpreted-to exclude coverage only for pollution-related damage
that is "expected and intended." 91
Even in the face of the many well-reasoned decisions rejecting their
arguments, insurance carriers urge the correctness of decisions adopting their
interpretation of the phrase "sudden and accidental." 92 These decisions,
however, also support the insureds' arguments. As many courts have
recognized, the mere fact that there is a split in decisions is, itself, persuasive
evidence of the ambiguity of the policy language. 93 As one court observed, the
"comprehensive debate" regarding the meaning of "sudden and accidental" in
and of itself "comes close to proving"that the provision is ambiguous. 94
2. The Insurance Industry Intended the "Sudden and Accidental"
Pollution Exclusion Only To Be a Clarification of the "Occurrence"
Language
When the insurance industry introduced the "sudden and accidental"
pollution exclusion in 1970, it was asked to explain the effect of the exclusion
to various state insurance authorities. These authorities were concerned that if
the exclusion reduced the coverage previously provided, it would, in effect,
result in a premium increase. In addressing these concerns, the Mutual
Insurance Rating Bureau ("MIRB"), an insurance industry association, noted:
90 See Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super.
516, 534, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (1987); Kipin Indus., Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41
Ohio App. 3d 228, 231, 535 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1987) (the pollution exclusion does not
eliminate coverage "if the damaging result is neither expected nor intended by the
insured...-).
91 See, e.g., Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp.
571 (D. Colo. 1989); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F.
Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380
S.E.2d 686 (1989); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 M.
App. 3d 378, 535 N.E.2d 1071 (1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220
(Maine 1980); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App.
3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
92 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31
(8th Cir. 1988); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30
(1st Cir. 1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D.
Mich. 1988).
93 See Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among
Other Courts or Jurisdictions Considering Same Question, As Evidence 7That Particular
Clause of Insurance Policy Is Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1253, 1255 (1981).
94 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139,
1156 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
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[The proposed exclusion] is actually a clarification of the original intent, in
that the definition of occurrence excludes damages that can be said to be
expected or intended. However, coverage would be afforded, as heretofore,
where the damage was the result of a discharge, dispersal, release or escape
that was sudden and accidental. 95
Simultaneously, a number of insurance carriers advised insurance brokers and
insureds that the new exclusion was nothing more than a "restatement" to
clarify the original intent. 96 Indeed, the Insurance Rating Bureau, another
insurance industry organization, stated in 1970 that the proposed "sudden and
accidental" language "clarifies the situation" under existing policies in which
"expected and intended" damages "are excluded by the definition of
'occurrence' in the policies." 97
The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner relied upon these and similar
statements in approving the "sudden and accidental"pollution exclusion for use.
The Commissioner specifically noted that insurance carriers and organizations
"have represented to the Insurance Commissioner, orally and in writing, that
the proposed exclusions ... are merely clarifications of existing coverages as
defined and limited in the definitions of the term 'occurrence' .... 98 The
Commissioner therefore found that "[t]o the extent that said exclusions are
mere clarifications of existing coverages, the Insurance Commissioner finds
that there is no objection to the approval of such. .. .99
95 Letter from Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau to Hon. Samuel H. Weese, Insurance
Commissioner (July 30, 1970) (emphasis added), Ex. 9 to Declaration of David W. Steuber
in Support of Motion of FMC Corporation for Partial Summary Adjudication of Issues
Respecting Certain Policies Issued By Defendants on Grounds of Judicial Estoppel and
Collateral Estoppel, FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058 (Cal. Santa Clara
Super. Ct., motion filed Sept. 26, 1988).
96 See, e.g., Letter from B. Buge, Jr., Resident Vice President, Insurance Company
of North America, to "All Our Insurance Producers"(April 14, 1970) Ex. U to Declaration
of Mark S. Mayerson in Support of Stauffer's and Montrose's Opposition to the Insurers'
Motion for Summary Judgment, Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Corp.,
No. C 594 148 (Cal. Los Angeles Super. Ct.) (the "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion "is, in essence, a re-statement of the basic coverage appearing in existing
contract").
9 7JRB Files Pollution Liability Exclusions, BUSINESS INSURANCE 46 (June 8, 1970).
98 Order, State of West Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, Administrative Hearing
No. 70-4 (Aug. 19, 1970), Ex. 10 to Declaration of David W. Steuber in Support of Motion
of FMC Corporation for Partial Summary Adjudication of Issues Respecting Certain
Policies Issued By Defendants on Grounds of Judicial Estoppel and Collateral Estoppel,
FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058 (Cal. Santa Clara Super. Ct., motion
filed Sept. 26, 1988).
9 9 1d.
1991] 1155
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Almost two decades later, in light of the insurance industry's continuing
efforts to broaden the scope of the pollution exclusion, the West Virginia
Insurance Commissioner has spoken again. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Triangle Industries, Inc.,1°° the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner filed
an amicus brief addressing the 1970 filing by the MIRB. In its amicus papers,
the Commissioner criticizes insurance carriers for now asserting that the
exclusion bars coverage unless the pollution arises out of an "abrupt" or
"instantaneous" event. The Commissioner states that this new interpretation
"would contradict the insurers' representations to the Insurance Commissioner,
would do violence to the Insurance Commissioner's Order in 1970, and would
undermine the ability of the Insurance Commissioner to protect the public from
'inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading' policy wording."101 The
Commissioner also states that the pollution exclusion eliminates coverage only
if the damage was specifically expected or intended by the insured, even if the
damage occurred gradually. 102 In urging rejection of the insurance industry's
misleading interpretation, the Commissioner concludes that "the insurers must
be held to their word." 103
The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner's position is correct. The
insurance industry made promises and representations to its customers and to
various state agencies. Those promises and representations should be
binding 10 4 and should be enforced.
B. The "Sudden and Accidental"and "Absolute "Pollution Exclusions Do
Not Apply in Many Settings
In the face of purported "absolute"pollution exclusions, a number of courts
have concluded that such exclusions are unambiguous and that they exclude
coverage for all damage caused by the discharge of pollutants. 10 5 This does not
mean, however, that the "absolute" pollution exclusion or the "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion applies to all claims involving pollution-related
100 No. CC999 (W. Va. Jan. 1990).
101 Motion of the Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia to File an Amicus Brief at
2, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., No. CC999 (W. Va. Jan. 1990).
102 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia at 4, id.
103 Id. at 10.
10 4 See Steuber, The Doctrines of Judicial and Collateral Estoppel: 7e 1970 Pollution
Exclusion Clause Proceedings Before the West Virginia Insurance Comnissioner, 2 ENVr'L
CLAIMS J. 317, 325-28 (1990).
105 See, e.g., Guilford Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 792, 794
(D. Maine 1988) (The absolute pollution exclusion "is clear and unambiguous."), afid, 879
F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1989) (mem.); Mearl Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. L-5946-90
(N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1991) (absolute pollution exclusion "is clear and unambiguous"
and excludes coverage).
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damage. In fact, courts have recognized situations in which these exclusions do
not apply to the claims presented.
1. Pollution Exclusions Should Not Apply When the Insured Is Not an
Active Polluter
Courts have recognized that pollution exclusions, whether "sudden and
accidental" 6r "absolute," should not apply to exclude coverage for an insured
who is not an active polluter. For example, in Niagara County v. Utica Mutual
Insurance Co.,1°6 a county was one of the defendants in the "Love Canal"
litigation. Its insurance carrier contended that coverage was excluded by a
sudden and accidental pollution exclusion, which had been incorporated in the
policy and in New York statutes. The county responded by arguing that
because it did not dump or abandon chemicals, and was not charged with doing
so, the exclusion should not apply, even though the exclusion did not contain
any language limiting its applicability to active polluters. The court agreed,
stating:
The fact that the statute, and in this case the exclusionary clause itself, fails to
contain language which limits the exclusion to acts by the insured is of no
moment, for to hold otherwise would require that we disregard the unqualified
public policy intendment of the statute to prohibit pollutors from spreading the
risk of loss through the instrument of liability insurance. 1 0 7
A Washington court of appeals reached a similar conclusion. In United
Pacific Insurance Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc.,108 the court stated:
In construing the pollution exclusion clause, we conclude that it was
intended to deprive active polluters from coverage, and not to apply where, as
here, the damage caused was neither expected nor intended ....
The insured in the case before us was not an active polluter. The gasoline
leaking from a hole in the underground line was not expected or intended, nor
was the resulting damage. Thus, the pollution exclusion clause did not exclude
coverage for the third party claims and suits against the insured. 109
More recently, an Illinois court of appeals has rejected the application of a
pollution exclusion to an insured that was not an active polluter. As the court
explained:
106 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
107 Id. at 419, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
108 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262 (1983).
109 Id. at 710-14, 664 P.2d at 1264-66.
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It is not clear from the circumstances of this case, and from the
underwriting history of the exclusionary clause .... that the parties intended
the exclusionary clause to apply whether the insured was an active polluter or
not. Certainly, those engaged in manufacturing processes would be expected to
have sought other or additional insurance had they known that the mere act of
engaging an independent agency such as a waste disposal in the ordinary course
of having industrial wastes removed from their property would result in the
denial of insurance coverage. There is nothing in the record to show whether
such additional insurance was even available when defendants purchased
their... policy. This ambiguity must be resolved against [the insurance
carrier] .... 110
The approach taken by these courts is not a unique or new approach to the
application of insurance exclusions."' Indeed, the Niagara County court cited
as support for its conclusion an earlier decision addressing the applicability of a
sistership exclusion (which purportedly excludes coverage for voluntary
withdrawal of an insured's products). As the court explained:
In Lipton, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356.... an
exclusionary clause made the insurance policy inapplicable to damage claims
for the withdrawal of the insured's products from the market because of defects
and deficiencies. The court held that this referred to withdrawal of the products
by the insured, not third parties, despite the fact that the exclusionary clause
was silent on the point. 112
The "sistership" exclusion derives its name from "an incident in the aircraft
industry in which one plane crashed and its 'sisterships' were thereafter
grounded and recalled by the manufacturer in order to correct the common
defect which had caused the crash." 113 A majority of the courts that have
considered the sistership exclusion have held that it applies only when the
insured, as opposed to a third party, withdraws the defective product. In Arcos
110 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d
378, 385, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (1989).
111 See, e.g., Covington Township v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 793,
800 (M.D. Pa. 1986) ("[The court finds that the [pollution] exclusion does not relieve
defendant of its duty to defend claims based on the discharge, etc., of waste material by
those other than the named insured."). Contra Outboard Marine Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 212 Ill. App. 3d 231, 570 N.E.2d 1154 (il. App. Jan. 31, 1991) (rejecting argument
that exclusion only applies to active polluters); but see Centennial Ins. Co. v. R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., No. H89-410 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 11, 1991) (refusing to follow
Outboard Marine and following Specialty Coatings).
112 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
113 Arcos Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 380, 384 n.2 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 1 1 4 for example, the insured
manufactured a defective product that was incorporated into a submarine. It
was sued for the cost and expenses incurred in investigating, locating,
removing, and replacing the defective product. When presented with a claim
for coverage, the insurance carrier declined, leading to a lawsuit. The court
rejected the application of the "sistership" exclusion, stating that it "applies only
if the product or property of which it is a part is 'withdrawn from the market
or from use' by the insured .... -115
The same rationale should apply with respect to pollution exclusions.
Coverage should be excluded only if the insured caused the pollution; pollution
generated by others for which the insured may be held liable is not within the
purview of the exclusion.
2. Pollution Exclusions Should Not Apply If the Insured Faces Claims
Based on Theories Other Than the Discharge of Pollutants
By their terms, pollution exclusions apply only to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape"of pollutants.
Thus, if liability is sought to be imposed against an insured for any other
reason, the exclusions should not apply. This reasoning has been accepted by
courts. In Niagara County v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,116 for example, a
New York court of appeals held:
The complaints in the underlying actions, besides charging the various
defendants collectively with dumping and abandoning chemicals, waste
products, etc., further allege that Niagara County was negligent in failing to
warn and safeguard its citizens or enforce its health regulations, failing to
remove chemicals and the plaintiffs from the Love Canal area and negligently
and wrongly conveying property in the area without notice of the infirmities
contained and in violation of ordinances and regulations. Clearly, these
allegations fall outside the disputed pollution exclusion provision of the policy.
The general rule is that the insurer must defend provided that some of the
allegations fall within the coverage provisions of the policy, even though
others do not .... In order for the insurer to be relieved from its duty to
defend, the insurer must "demonstrate that the allegations of the complaint cast
that pleading solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and, further, that
114 Id.
115 Id. at 385; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 554 F. Supp.
290, 295 (D. Ariz. 1983) (exclusion "applies only when the insured removes the product
from the market due to defects found within a sample of the product. Since no withdrawal,
repair, or removal has been made by the insureds, this exclusion is not applicable");
Bigelow-Liptak Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 417 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-82 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (same).
116 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
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the allegations, in toto, are subject to no other interpretation".... In the
instant case, [the insurer] has failed to meet that burden. 117
An almost identical conclusion was reached by a federal court in Covington
Township v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co. 118 As this court explained:
At most, the improper discharge or storage of sewage is but one of the
theories on which the insured's liability is based. Certainly, other theories, i.e.,
failure to monitor or wrongfully issuing permits, are not contained in the
[pollution] exclusion. Again, it is established that if an insurer must defend any
claims against an insured in the... complaint, it must defend all of them.
1 19
Courts have recognized in dealing with other exclusions that even if one
particular theory of liability or claim is excluded, a carrier may still be
obligated to respond if another theory of liability or claim is covered. There is
no reason to deprive an insured of benefits for one claim in a lawsuit under one
provision of a policy simply because coverage for other claims in the suit may
be excluded. As one court observed in discussing an insurance carrier's duties
for claims involving a product when product coverage was not provided:
Under the cause of action in the proposed pleadings, if proven, plaintiffs'
injuries would be caused by the misrepresentations and fraudulent concealment
of information which resulted in their not terminating the purchase and use of
the product or taking other steps which might have prevented the harmful
consequences of continued use. The separate cause of action based on such
continued purchase and use of the product resulting from the
misrepresentations and fraudulent concealment is distinct from the conduct of
defendants in manufacturing and marketing the product which forms the basis
of the causes of action in negligence and products liability .... 120
Therefore, if an insured is sued on theories or claims premised on its
actions or inactions other than its discharge of pollutants, there should be
coverage even if the policy contains an "absolute"pollution exclusion.
117 Id. at 420-21, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 541-42.
118 639 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
119 Id. at 800.
120 Angie v. Johns-Manville Corp., 94 A.D.2d 939, 940, 463 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957
(1983); see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 537 (8th Cir. 1970)
(insurance carrier obligated to defend negligence claim although coverage excluded for
claim based on injury to property while in insured's care); Schwamb v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
41 N.Y.2d 947, 949, 363 N.E.2d 356, 357, 394 N.Y.S. 2d 632, 633 (1977) (insurance
carrier obligated to defend against failure to warn claim, although insured's conduct fell
within criminal conduct exclusion).
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3. Pollution Exclusions Should Not Apply Unless a "Contaminant" or
'7rritant" Is Involved
The 1982 ISO form pollution exclusion purportedly applies, as noted
above, to exclude coverage for "bodily injury"or "property damage" arising out
of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of "pollutants." The ISO form
defines pollutants as follows:
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals
and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or
reclaimed. 121
By its terms, then, a "pollutant" must be an "irritant or contaminant."
Therefore, if a substance is not an "irritant or contaminant," the exclusion
should not apply.
This approach has been followed by at least some courts. For example, in
In re Hub Recycling, Inc. v. Louis Usdin Co.,122 the court considered insurance
coverage for an insured that recycled various materials, including construction
debris. The insured requested that its carrier respond to claims against it for
allegedly dumping this debris on a third party's property. The carrier declined
coverage, citing an absolute pollution exclusion. The court rejected the
insurance carrier's argument, concluding that "the insurer must prove that the
waste in question is either an irritant or contaminant in order for the exclusion
to apply. "1' 3
Furthermore, even if a substance arguably is an "irritant or contaminant," it
should not be within the purview of a pollution exclusion unless it is
recognized to be a hazardous substance. As one court recently explained:
Of course, there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that
would not irritate or damage some person or property. The terms "irritant"and
"contaminant,"however, cannot be read in isolation, but must be construed as
substances generally recognized as polluting the environment. In other words,
121 Insurance Services Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy
Form ("Occurrence"), reprinted in K. PASICH, CAsuALTY AND LLABILrrY INSURANCE,
Form 2 (1991).
122 106 Bankr. 372 (D.N.J. 1989).
123 Id. at 374-75; see also Guilford Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp.
792, 794 (D. Me. 1988) ("[A]lmost any substance might fall within the exclusion, but it can
only do so in certain very precisely drawn circumstances: if it is an irritant or a
contaminant."), aff'd, 879 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1989) (mem.); Molton, Allen & Williams,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 100 (Ala. 1977) (damage caused by
sand and mud resulting from real estate development is not damage caused by "irritant,
contaminant or pollutant").
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a "pollutant"is not merely any substance that may cause harm to the "egg shell
plaintiff," but rather it is a toxic or particularly harmful material which is
recognized as such in industry or by governmental regulators. 124
Thus, the pollution exclusion should apply only if the substance is an
irritant or contaminant and is recognized to be hazardous.
VI. PERSONAL INJURY COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
In the face of demands for insurance coverage for environmental claims,
insurance carriers argue that the only provisions in their insurance policies that
could provide coverage for environmental liabilities are those provisions
insuring against claims of "bodily injury" and "property damage." They
specifically deny that the "personal injury" provisions in CGL insurance
policies afford any coverage for environmental claims. 125 This is not, however,
true. Personal injury provisions were introduced to provide broad protection
for insureds for a number of "offenses," which encompass the trespass,
nuisance, and other claims alleged against insureds in the environmental
context.
A. The Personal Injury Provisions
In 1966, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters drafted a standard
endorsement providing coverage for "personal injury" for use in connection
with the standard form CGL policies. 126 The 1966 endorsement provided, in
relevant part:
Them Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury (herein
124 Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 90-2305-0, slip op. at 14 (D.
Kan. June 25, 1991). The court also recognized that activity that might release irritating
substances can be characterized as "polluting" under the exclusion. See id., slip op. at 13-
14.
125 "Personal injury" is different from "bodily injury." See Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 218 N.J. Super. 492, 499, 528 A.2d 64, 67
(1987) ("'personal injury' coverage is not the same as bodily injury coverage in insurance
terms.. . .It is broader and more comprehensive than the term bodily injury, 'which is
limited to impact to the body'"); 3 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACtiCE § 49.40[3],
at 49-69 (1990) ("[The term 'personal' is used in a highly specialized sense. It does not
mean physical damage to a person; rather, it means injury arising out of one or more
specified offenses.").
126 See Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969).
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called "personal injury") sustained by any person or organization and arising
out of one or more of the following offenses:
Group C--wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private
occupancy .... 127
B. Personal Injury Provisions Cover Common-Law and Statutory
Environmental Claims
1. Personal Injury Provisions Cover Claims Based on Trespass,
Nuisance, and Interference with the Use or Enjoyment of Property
The standard personal injury endorsement was adopted in 1966 so that
coverage would be broadened and no longer "confined to those damages
resulting from 'bodily injury or property damage.'' 128 Therefore, it is not
surprising that courts which have examined the scope of coverage afforded for
the "wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private
occupancy" offenses have concluded that the coverage applies to a variety of
claims alleging interference with interests attending to the possession or
enjoyment of real property.
For example, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Krekeler,129 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an insurance carrier whose policy
covered "wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right of private
occupancy" was required to defend an action for trespass and battery. The
Eighth Circuit concluded that because the trespass made the battery possible
and because a trespasser would be liable under applicable state law for all
injuries proximately caused by the trespass, the carrier had a duty to defend. 130
A similar conclusion was reached in Gardner v. Romano.131 In Gardner, a
federal district court held that a landlord's discrimination against potential
tenants based on their race violated their private right of occupancy and was,
therefore, insured under a personal injury provision. In so holding, the court
rejected the insurance carrier's argument that no coverage was provided
because plaintiffs were not alleging any interference with a possessory right.
The court held that the phrase "other invasion of the right of private occupancy"
is ambiguous and concluded that the policy covered claims for race
discrimination. 132 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. 133
127 Id. at 1239.
128 Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 126, at 1238.
129 491 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1974).
130 Id. at 885-87.
131 688 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
132 Id. at 492-93.
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Courts also have recognized that insurance carriers must defend and
indemnify their insureds against claims alleging interference with the use or
enjoyment of property. A physical invasion of real property is not necessary to
trigger coverage-any alleged interference is covered under the "personal
injury" provisions of the policies. In Town of Goshen v. Grange Mutual
Insurance Co.,134 for example, the underlying complaint alleged that the
town's planning board had "delayed and obfuscated the attempts made by the
plaintiff to gain subdivision approval..." for his real property and
demonstrated an intent to "deny the plaintiff ... his right to thefree enjoyment
of his property ... ."135 The insurance carrier argued that there was no
coverage because there were no allegations of invasion, intrusion, or
interference by any person or thing upon plaintiff's land. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court rejected this argument, ruling that the carrier had a duty to
defend. The court stated:
The trial court ruled that "the right to the private occupancy of land
connotes far more than the right to be free merely from physical intrusions."
We cannot accept [the insurance carrier's] argument that an appreciable
and tangible interference with the physical property itself is necessary to
constitute an "invasion of the right of private occupancy." 136
133 See, e.g., Fragomeno v. Insurance Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 822, 828, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 111, 114 (1989) ("personal injury" provision obligates insurance carrier to defend and
indemnify insured for "any act constituting an invasion of the right of private occupancy
which incurs tort liability.. .. "); Accredited Bond Agencies, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 352 So.
2d 1252 (Fla. App. 1977) (duty to defend complaint alleging that insured's purported agent
committed aggravated assault and battery by prodding plaintiff's minor child with a pistol
after wrongful entry into plaintiff's residence); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 153 Ga. App.
291, 265 S.E.2d 102 (1980) (wrongful entry coverage obligated insurance carrier to defend
suit for conversion when complaint alleged repossession was accomplished by insured's
technically deficient entry onto premises). But see Martin v. Brunzelle, 699 F. Supp. 167
(N.D. 111. 1988) (insurance carrier not obligated to defend insured against discrimination
claim).
134 120 N.H. 915, 424 A.2d 822 (1980).
135 Id. at 916, 424 A.2d at 823-24.
136 Id. at 917, 424 A.2d at 824. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Town of Stoddard v. Northern See. Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1062, 1064-65 (D.N.H.
1989) (enactment of zoning amendment limiting development constitutes "personal injury");
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 940 (Fla. App. 1985) (personal
injury provisions cover allegations of discrimination that prevented claimants from using or
enjoying their property and from obtaining marketable title thereto without physical
invasion), aff'd on relearing en banc, 509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. App. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989).
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Insurance carriers also have attempted to limit the breadth of the personal
injury coverage by arguing that the phrase "wrongful entry or eviction or other
invasion of the right of private occupancy" does not include within its scope
trespass or nuisance claims. This argument is not supportable. "Trespass" and
"nuisance" are torts involving interference with the possession or ability to use
property. "Trespass," for example, is customarily defined to be a "wrongful
entry"--one of the precise offenses covered under personal injury provisions. 137
Indeed, legal commentators long ago recognized that there are "a broad range
of wrongs under the general heading of 'invasion of the right of private
occupancy,' which might be covered under Group C."138
Given the lack of support for any arguments narrowing the scope of the
personal injury provisions to exclude coverage for trespass and injury claims, it
is not surprising that insurance carrier representatives have testified that
personal injury provisions apply to trespass and nuisance claims, both as part
of the phrase "wrongful entry" and as part of the phrase "other invasion of the
right of private occupancy." 139 Therefore, there should be little legitimate
dispute that personal injury provisions apply to trespass and nuisance claims. 140
137 See Triscony v. Brandenstein, 66 Cal. 514, 516, 6 P. 384, 385 (1885) ("[E]very
wrongful entry upon lands in the occupation or possession of the owner constitutes a
trespass... ."); Hansen v. Gary Naugle Constr. Co., 801 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1990)
("The essence of the [trespass] action is wrongful entry."); R. Mehr, et al., Principles of
Insurance 67 (8th ed. 1985) ('Trespass to real property arises from the wrongful entry on
the land of another or failure to remove property from another's land when an obligation
exists to do so. Trespass includes invasion of the area above and below the land as well as
the surface of the land."); see, e.g., Littleton v. State, 66 Haw. 55, 656 P.2d 1336 (1982).
138 Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 126, at 1240-41. As these commentators observe:
"Thus coverage is afforded for interference with possession and enjoyment by means such
as noise, leaky roofs, obstruction of access, obnoxious fumes, and others, actionable on a
variety of theories such as breach of a lease, nuisance or trespass."Id. at 1241 n.96.
139 See, e.g., Transcript of Deposition of Pacific Indemnity Company at 182-84, Ex.
K to Notice of Motion and Motion by Northrop for Summary Adjudication of Issues
Against Continental, Great American, and Pacific Indemnity ("Personal Injury"), Northrop
Corp. v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. C 566129 (Cal. Los Angeles Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1989)
(claims of trespass, invasion of right of private occupancy and interference with use of
property are potentially covered under personal injury coverage provisions); Transcript of
Deposition of Great American Insurance Company, at 128-29, Ex. J to Northrop Motion,
id. (same).
140 However, some insurance carriers attempt to distinguish between "public nuisance"
and "private nuisance," arguing that there should be no coverage under personal injury
provisions for "public nuisance"because "public nuisance" does not involve an interference
with the right of private occupancy. This argument should be rejected. First, the offense of
"wrongful entry or eviction" is not limited to a "private occupancy" setting. Beltway
Management Co. v. Lexington-Landmark Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 1145, 1153 (D.D.C.
1990) ("The elision of 'wrongful' in front of eviction indicates that wrongful entry and
wrongful eviction are part of the same group. The second conjunction indicates a second
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2. Pollution Claims Are Premised on Trespass, Nuisance, and
Interference Theories
It has been recognized for centuries that common-law tort theories supply
an injured party with relief for pollution-caused damages. 141 The two most
heavily used causes of action for addressing pollution-related damages have
been causes of action for trespass and nuisance. 142 Therefore, many insureds
have been sued for environmental damage by private parties and government
entities on theories of trespass, nuisance, and interference with the use and
enjoyment of the plaintiffs' property.
In addition to facing common-law claims for environmental damage, many
insureds also face demands, claims, and suits arising from CERCLA, RCRA,
and other environmental laws. These laws derive from common-law causes of
action, including causes of action for nuisance and trespass. Congress' intent to
codify longstanding common-law concepts that historically had been applied to
pollution claims is evidenced in the legislative history of CERCLA. For
example, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, in its
Report accompanying S. 1480 (the Senate version of the bill that ultimately was
grouping [for "other invasion of the right of private occupancy"], and 'other' emphasizes
that this second group refers to a different type of harm.') (emphasis added).
Second, the distinctioii between "public" and "private" nuisance is limited to the
nuisance context; it has no application to trespass claims. Third, the fact that a "public"
nuisance may be involved does not eliminate the potentiality for the involvement of a
"private" nuisance. See, e.g., Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d
116, 124, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1971) ("Where... the nuisance is a private as well as a
public one, there is no requirement that the plaintiff suffer damage different in kind from
that suffered by the general public and he 'does not lose his rights as a landowner merely
because others suffer damage of the same kind, or even of the same degree .... ").
141 As Lord Blackstone stated in the Eighteenth Century:
[[If one erects a smelting house for lead so near the land of another, that the vapor
and smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages his cattle therein; this is held to be a
nusance ....
[IUt is a nusane... to corrupt or poison a waterecourse, by erecting a dye-house
or a lime-pit for the use of trade, in the upper part of the stream; or in short to do any
act therein, that in its consequences must necessarily tend to the prejudice of one's
neighbour.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 217-18 (1758) (notes
omitted).142 See Note, State Comnon Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes: Can
They Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 609, 609 n.4 (trespass and nuisance are two of
the traditional common law tort actions used by courts to address pollution).
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enacted as CERCLA), 143 states that common-law nuisance theories are one of
the sources of CERCLA's strict liability provisions: "Another source of legal
precedent for strict liability for hazardous substance disposal sites or
contaminated areas is nuisance theory. Damage actions involving the
maintenance of a public or private nuisance often involve a kind of strict
liability standard." 144
There also is Congressional recognition that RCRA incorporates common-
law theories. According to a House of Representatives subcommittee,
"[s]ection 7003 [of RCRA] incorporates the legal theories used for centuries to
assess liability for creating a public nuisance (including intentional tort,
negligence and strict liability) for determining appropriate remedies. Terms
such as 'imminent' and 'substantial' have a rich judicial history from common
law nuisance actions." 145 Indeed, the common law of nuisance provides the
theoretical foundation for environmental statutory enactments during the last
twenty-five years: "the legal history of the environment has been written by
nuisance law."146
In light of the legislative history and the extensive commentary tracing the
development of environmental statutes to common law concepts, it is not
surprising that courts have uniformly concluded that CERCLA and RCRA
incorporate common-law concepts of liability. In New York v. Shore Realty
Corp.,147 for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's power to hear state law public nuisance claims along with federal
CERCLA claims, because the common-law claims and CERCLA claims
143 See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) ("After S. 1480 ran into
opposition, the Senate considered two compromise bills intended to be 'a combination of the
best of [H.R. 85, H.R. 7020, and S. 14801.'... The second of these... eventually
became CERCLA.") (quoting 126 Cong. Rec. 30935 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Stafford)).
144 Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, Environmental Emergency
Response Act, S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980).
145 House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Report (Hazardous Waste Disposal) 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm.
Print 1979). See Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, Solid Waste Disposal
Act Amendments of 1980, S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5019, 5023 (same).
146 1 W. RODGERs, ENViRONMENTAL LAw: AiR AND WATER, 5-7 (1986). Most
state statutes also are patterned after federal statutes (which, in turn, incorporate common
law theories) or are based directly on common-law theories. See, e.g., State v. Ventron
Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 499, 468 A.2d 150, 163 (1983) ("Mhe [New Jersey] Spill Act does not
so much change substantive liability as it establishes new remedies for activities recognized
as tortious both under prior statutes and the common law.").
147 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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clearly derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.148 Other courts have
reached the same conclusion. 149
3. Personal Injury Provisions Apply to Pollution Claims
The insurance industry has long been aware that its insurance policies,
including personal injury provisions, apply to claims of trespass, nuisance, and
pollution-related damage. Commentators stated more than twenty years ago that
personal injury coverage applied to claims of "nuisance or trespass" and claims
based on "obnoxious fumes .... "150 Likewise, more than a decade ago, ISO
specifically considered expanding the standard form pollution exclusion so that
it would apply to personal injury. As ISO drafters stated in discussing a
proposed new version of the exclusion:
By using the new defined term "injury" this [pollution] exclusion is now
applicable to "personal injury" as well as "bodily injury" and "property
damages." This became necessary because there was a case under which the
court found that the insurer was liable for a pollution case under the personal
injury coverage. 15 1
While ISO did not adopt the recommended change in the pollution exclusion,
this memorandum clearly evidences that the insurance industry's drafting arm
felt that without the modification, personal injury coverage would apply to
environmental claims.
Two years after ISO rejected the extension of the pollution exclusion to
personal injury provisions, the American Insurance Association ("AIA'),
another trade association, acknowledged during congressional debates over the
enactment of CERCLA that standard form CGL insurance policies were
148 Id.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984)
(section 7003 of RCRA is "a congressional mandate that the former common law of
nuisance, as applied to situations in which a risk of harm from solid or hazardous wastes
exists, shall include new terms and concepts which shall be developed in a liberal, not a
restrictive, manner"); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171,
1184 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (an assessment by the Environmental Protection Agency that a site is
targeted for cleanup "is tantamount to a governmental finding that the land is a public
nuisance"); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo.
1985) ("it is quite clear that Section 7003 is essentially a codification of the common law of
public nuisance").
150 Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 126, at 1241 n.96.
151 Comments, "Exclusion-Contamination or Pollution," Revised Explanatory
Memorandum and Analytical Comments to Revised Draft of Commercial General Liability
Policy, attached to Letter, M. Jendraszek, General Liability Division of ISO to the
Members of the General Liability Rules and Forms Committe& (Sept. 28, 1978).
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intended to provide coverage for the common-law claims of trespass and
nuisance. In a letter to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, the AIA stated: "Premiums collected for insurance contracts for
pollution liability terminated years in the past were based on common law
theories of liability such as negligence, trespass, nuisance and riparian
rights." 152 The AIA also observed:
S. 1480 would apply the most advanced common law theories of
liability... to fact situations which took place and insurance contracts which
were made years ago .... If the occurrence which results in alleged liability is
continual, insurers which provided pollution liability coverage years ago may
be subjected to the liability concepts in S. 1480.153
Having lost in its attempts to keep CERCLA from being enacted, the
insurance industry later launched another effort to avoid liability under CGL
insurance policies. When Congress considered the reauthorization of CERCLA
in 1984 and 1985, the A!A unsuccessfully attempted to have Congress
legislatively eliminate insurance coverage for CERCLA-based claims.
Specifically, the AIA proposed that the reauthorization include what it called
the "Silver Bullet" Amendment:
No insurer shall be liable under any policy of liability insurance with an
inception date before December 11, 1980, for defense with respect to, or
payment or indemnification of, costs of response, removal, remedial action or
damages, as defined in CERCLA and recoverable under CERCLA or any
other law, on property owned, leased, or used by the policyholder or on
property where hazardous substances for which the policyholder is alleged to
have any legal responsibility have been placed for storage, treatment or
disposal. 154
If enacted, the Silver Bullet Amendment would have eliminated coverage
for all environmental liabilities predating the enactment of CERCLA. As a
representative of Crum & Forster Insurance Companies stated in explaining the
effect of the Silver Bullet Amendment to a Senate Committee's Majority
Counsel: "But whether the costs are imposed pursuant to Federal statute or
152 96 Cong. Rec. S12919-20 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon)
(letter, Sept. 17, 1980, American Insurance Association to Senator Howard W. Cannon).
153 Id.
154 Draft Amendment to Section 107 (June 25, 1985), Enclosure to Letter from Leslie
Cheek, Ill, Vice President-Federal Affairs, Crum & Forster Insurance Companies, to Curtis
A. Moore, Majority Counsel, Senate Comm. on Environment & Public Works (June 26,
1985). Perhaps because of concern about the impact of calling the proposed amendment the
"Silver Bullet" amendment, the name of the amendment was changed to "COPI'----
"Clarification of Policy Intent."
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State statutory or common law, the effect of the amendment is to preclude
coverage of those costs under the identified liability insurance policies." 155
By these actions, the AIA acknowledged that common-law claims of
trespass and nuisance for environmental damage were covered under CGL
policies, that CERCLA embodies those common-law liability concepts, and
that, therefore, CERCLA claims are also insured under CGL policies. In spite
of these facts, insurance carriers now argue that personal injury coverage does
not apply to trespass or nuisance claims in the environmental setting. Some
courts have accepted the insurance carriers' argument. 156 The few decisions to
accept the insurance carriers' argument, however, typically have done so
without any analysis or reasoning, thereby severely limiting the precedential
and persuasive value of those decisions. 157
To date, only one federal appellate court has examined and analyzed a
personal injury coverage provision to determine whether it applies to
environmental claims. In 7itan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 158
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied a personal
injury coverage provision to environmental claims. In Titan Holdings, the
insured city had been sued by two individuals who alleged that they had been
"'continuously bombarded by and exposed to noxious, fetid and putrid odors,
gases and particulates, to loud and disturbing noises during the night, and to
unduly bright night lighting' emanating from the City's sewage treatment
plant. -159 The complaint included claims characterized as trespass and
nuisance and alleged that the operation of the sewage plant had "unreasonably
and substantially interfered with" the plaintiffs' "quiet enjoyment of the
homestead" and had substantially deprived them "of the use of the
homestead." 160 The city sought coverage from its- insurance carriers. The
carriers responded with various grounds for refusing to cover the claims,
including assertion of the pollution exclusion.
After considering the various arguments, the First Circuit addressed the
question of whether the allegations before it were within the tort of "wrongful
entry":
155 Letter from Leslie Cheek, IIl, Vice President-Federal Affairs, Cram & Forster
Insurance Companies, to Curtis A. Moore, Majority Counsel, Senate Comm. on
Environment & Public Works (June 26, 1985).
156 See, e.g., Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., No. C-3956-85
(N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1987) ('The personal injury clause of the policies do not provide
coverage to plaintiff.').
157 See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 86 MR 308 (I1.
Lake County Cir. Ct. May 17, 1989) (court's analysis consisted only of statement that it
"discounts" the personal injury clause "as not being applicable to the facts of this case").
158 898 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990).
159 Id. at 267.
160 Id.
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The City also attempts to portray the [complaint] as alleging that the
plant's fumes, noise and light constitute a wrongful entry of, or eviction from,
their property. While we have been unable to find any New Hampshire cases
defining a tort of wrongful entry, we think it most closely resembles that of
trespass. (Indeed, the [plaintiffs] labelled Count I of their [complaint] as
sounding in "trespass and nuisance.") 16 1
The court concluded, however, that trespass had not been alleged because there
was no allegation of intentional conduct as required under New Hampshire
law.162
The court did not find this to be determinative because one of the insurance
policies covered "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy."163 The court noted that two New Hampshire cases held
that the phrase "other invasions of the right of private occupancy" is
ambiguous. 164 Given the ambiguity of this phrase, the court concluded that the
claim before it was covered by personal injury provisions:
The underlying claim in this case contains allegations that the City's
sewage treatment plant's noxious odors, noise and light have "unreasonably
and substantially interfered with [plaintiffs'] quiet enjoyment of the homestead
and have substantially deprived [them] of the use of the homestead." Town of
Goshen does not require an allegation of physical invasion before a claim
comes within coverage for liability arising from "other invasion of the right of
private occupancy."Therefore, construing the clause in favor of the insured, it
is reasonable and consonant with the ordinary meaning of the clause to hold
that the [plaintiffs'] suit alleges just such an invasion, and so is covered by
[the] policy. 165
The court specifically held that the "claims of liability for interference with
quiet enjoyment and use of [plaintiffs'] home arising from any means alleged,
including pollutants, fall within the Personal Injury coverage .... " 166
In light of the breadth of the personal injury language, the actions of ISO
and the AIA, and prior judicial decisions construing the personal injury
provision, the conclusion of the Titan Holdings court is well reasoned and
161 Id. at 272.
162 Id.
163 Id. (emphasis added).
164 Id. (discussing Town of Goshen v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 915, 424 A.2d
822 (1980) and Town of Epping v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 248, 444
A.2d 496 (1982)).
165 Id. at 273.
166 Id. at 274.
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persuasive. It is a conclusion that is likely to be, and should be, followed by
other courts. 16
7
C. The Benefits for Insureds of Personal Injury Provisions
Personal injury coverage provisions provide substantial benefits to
insureds. There are at least five benefits. First, personal injury provisions
typically contain aggregate limits of coverage separate and in addition to those
for other coverages provided by a CGL insurance policy. This means that even
if an insured has exhausted its bodily injury and property damage coverages,
personal injury coverage may be available.
Second, personal injury provisions typically do not contain an "occurrence"
trigger. Most personal injury provisions, including the standard form
endorsements, apply to "offenses" rather than to "occurrences." Courts and
commentators have concluded that coverage under personal injury provisions
does not require that there be an "occurrence." 168 As one court explained:
The Court also rejects [the insurance carrier's] assertion that coverage is
precluded because there has not been an "occurrence"as defined by the General
Policy. An occurrence is only required if there is a claim for "bodily injury" or
"property damage"; the Broad Form Endorsement does not make the existence
of an occurrence as defined by the general liability policy a prerequisite to
coverage. 169
This means that personal injury provisions in policies in effect over many
years potentially provide coverage. As courts have recognized, a "continuing
trespass" or a "continuing nuisance" may be deemed to take place from first
167 A number of trial courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., City of
Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., No. 90-CV-939, slip op. at 2-3 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 10,
1991) ("I find the personal injury provisions provide coverage for damages sustained
because of the migration of the [volatile organic compounds] into the ground
water .... Under the subject policies, this [contamination] constitutes both a personal
injury and property damage.").
168 See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla.
App. 1985) ("[Nlowhere in the personal injury liability coverage provision is there a
requirement that any claim be based on an occurrence."), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 509
So. 2d 945 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); Farbstein &
Stillman, supra note 126, at 1239 (one of the most important features of the standard form
personal injury endorsement is "the absence of any requirement that the loss be 'caused by
an occurrence'"); 1 P. LIGEaos, THE ATrORNEY'S UMBRELLA BOOK, Underlying
Coverage at 18 (1989) ("The word 'offenses' usually triggers primary personal injury
coverages, so coverage is not impaired by the definition of 'occurrence' in the CGL.").
169 Town of Stoddard v. Northern Sec. Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 n.3
(D.N.H. 1989).
1172 [Vol. 52:1131
INSURANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
contamination by a hazardous substance through abatement of the
contamination.1 70 Therefore, an "offense" should, for coverage purposes, be
deemed to have taken place as long as the substance was alleged to be present.
This should result in coverage under policies predating the discovery of the
contamination and should mean that several policies could cover a particular
environmental problem, even if a narrow "occurrence"defiuition is imposed for
purposes of property damage coverage.
Third, personal injury provisions cover intentional conduct. In fact, while
other portions of CGL policies exclude coverage for bodily injury or property
damage "expected or intended" by the insured, standard personal injury
provisions contain no such exclusionary language. Therefore, many courts have
upheld the applicability of personal injury coverage to intentional torts. 171 An
170 See, e.g., Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1989). In Regan, a
federal district court addressed the propriety of a trespass cause of action brought by the
owners of property against the former lessee of adjacent property who allegedly
contaminated the owners' property with hazardous wastes. The owners contended that the
allegations that the former lessee had deposited waste on land and left it there stated a valid
claim under the continuing trespass doctrine. The court cited to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts for the definition of "continuing trespass" as follows:
Continuing trespass. The actor's failure to remove from land in the possession of
another a structure, chattel, or other thing which he has tortiously ... placed on the
land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time during which the thing is on the
land and... confers on the possessor of the land an option to maintain a succession of
actions based on a theory of continuing trespass or to treat the continuance of the thing
on the land as an aggravation of the original trespass ....
Id. at 150 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161, comment b (1965)). The
court concluded that "plaintiffs have stated a valid tort claim under the continuing trespass
doctrine."ld. at 151. See also Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976, 1004-05 (D. Kan.
1984) (salt plant discharges constitute continuing public and private nuisances); Borland v.
Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 530 (Ala. 1979) ("[I1f the smoke or polluting
substance... causes discomfort and annoyance to the plaintiff in his use and enjoyment of
the property, then the plaintiff's remedy is for nuisance; but if, as a result of the defendant's
operation, the polluting substance is deposited upon the plaintiffs property, thus interfering
with his exclusive possessory interest by causing substantial damage to the Res, then the
plaintiff may seek his remedy in trespass, though his alternative remedy in nuisance may
coexist."). Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-
Gen. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1147, 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841 (1991) ("We note
plaintiffs' land may be subject to a continuing nuisance even though defendant's offensive
conduct ended years ago. That is because the 'continuing' nature of the nuisance refers to
the continuing damage caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the
offensive condition to occur.").
171 See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 188 Cal. App. 3d 438, 232 Cal. Rptr. 807
(1986) (malicious prosecution); Hartford Accident & Indem. v. Krekeler, 491 F.2d 884 (8th
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ISO drafting committee also has acknowledged that personal injury coverage
applies to intentional torts, noting that "'personal injury' usually involves
offenses which are 'intentional torts' ... .172
Fourth, the typical personal injury coverage endorsement does not contain,
and is therefore not subject to, a pollution exclusion or an owned property
exclusion, which are the two exclusions frequently cited by insurance carriers
in denying coverage for environmental claims. Additionally, even in situations
when personal injury coverage is provided in the body of the policy, rather
than in a separate endorsement, the pollution exclusion and owned property
exclusion typically are limited in their applicability, by their express terms, to
bodily injury and property damage only. 173
Cir. 1974) (battery). However, one court has held that coverage for certain intentional
conduct-religious discrimination in the case before it-is prohibited by public policy. See
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989). The court based its
decision on Florida's clearly expressed policy against intentional acts of religious
discrimination and the lack of other deterrents, such as substantial risks or expenses. But see
Gardner v. Romano, 688 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (personal injury provisions apply
to race discrimination claim). However, given the stringent nature of CERCLA and other
environmental laws and the significant expense of cleanup activities (plus possible fines),
there are deterrents to intentional environmental pollution. Therefore, the possible
availability of personal injury coverage should not encourage intentional pollution and
should not offend public policy.
172 Comments, "Definition-Occurrence," at 2, Revised Explanatory Memorandum
and Analytical Comments to Revised Draft of Commercial General Liability Policy,
attached to Letter, M. Jendraszek, General Liability Division of ISO to the Members of the
General Liability Rules and Forms Committee (Sept. 28, 1978); see also Mehr, et al., supra
note 137, at 310 ("Personal injury liaiblity coverage ... covers claims alleging intentional
torts ... ."); Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 126, at 1239-40 ("The personal injury
endorsement...[attempts] to furnish coverage under some circumstances for harm inflicted
intentionally be the insured.").
173 The standard form pollution exclusion, by its terms, applies only to "bodily injury
or property damage."Had it been intended to apply to personal injury, the phrase "personal
injury" could have been included. As noted above, ISO drafters recognized that the
pollution exclusion would not apply to personal injury coverage unless its wording were
changed. In fact, in Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.
1990), the First Circuit expressly rejected the argument that a pollution exclusion applied to
personal injury coverage. As the court noted, "pollution exclusion clauses only apply to
liability for 'bodily injury and property damage'; they do not apply to coverage for
'personal injury or advertising injury' liability." Id. at 270. The court therefore held that
"claims of liability for interference with quiet enjoyment and use" of property arising from
pollution "are not excluded by the pollution exclusion clause.... ."Id. at 274. Likewise, by
its terms the "owned property" exclusion applies only to "property damage" to property
owned, occdpied by or rented to the insured. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, Inc.,
Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy Form, § 1, Coverage A, Exclusion J
(1982).
1174 [Vol. 52:1131
INSURANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
Fifth, and finally, many insurance carriers fail to reserve their rights with
respect to personal injury coverage when they send reservation of rights letters
or declination letters regarding environmental claims. As a result, they may be
estopped from asserting or be deemed to have waived those rights. 174
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurance carriers may protest about the high cost of paying claims under
CGL policies, but those policies were sold as providing broad "comprehensive"
coverage. The exclusions contained therein should not be retroactively
expanded and the broad coverage provided by the personal injury provisions
should not be retroactively narrowed. While litigation may not be the most
desirable way for insureds to enforce their rights against their insurance
carriers, insureds are entitled to the protection for which they paid. And, while
insurance coverage litigation over environmental claims is likely to go on for
years, courts are likely to continue granting that protection.
174 See Dillingham Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 1181, 1185
(9th Cir. 1974) ("When an insurer denies liability upon a specific ground, other grounds of
forfeiture then within its knowledge are waived."); A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES § 2.13, at 50-51 (2d ed. 1988) ("The courts have generally held that insurers are
precluded from later asserting policy defenses that are not so specified" in reservation of
rights letters).
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